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AGAINST THE CURRENT: COUNTERVAILING DUTIES, UPSTREAM
SUBSIDIES AND THE TRADE REMEDIES REFORM ACT OF 1984
Eric P. SALONEN *
It is safe to say that there is now no government professing to adhere to the private-enter-
prise system which does not to an ever increasing extent insinuate itself into the macroeco-
nomics of a country [1].
Judge Maletz, Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States
1. Introduction
Ambivalence underlies the U.S. trade policy on government participation in
the marketplace. This ambivalence is evidenced by certain trade laws and
agreements which are based on competing economic theories that simulta-
neously sanction free trade principles and government interventionist policies
[2]. It is exemplified by certain countervailing duty (CVD) determinations
made by the International Trade Administration (ITA) in cases involving
upstream and natural resource subsidies [3].
In its attempt to reconcile free trade and interventionist policies, the ITA
has been unable to administer the CVD laws consistently in upstream and
natural resource cases. The crux of the problem lies in the fact that the ITA has
no universal standard to aid it in determining whether a foreign government's
practice constitutes a subsidy [4]. Yet, such a standard is crucial for its
countervailing duty investigations since these investigations focus on two
issues: (1) whether a particular foreign government's practice confers a subsidy
on an industry within its jurisdiction, and (2) whether that industry's exports to
the United States should be subject to countervailing duties that would offset
the exact benefits of the subsidy [5].
While the ITA has developed some administrative standards in its effort to
remedy the situation, it is clear from even a cursory examination of the
relevant ITA determinations that the ITA's difficulties are rooted in the CVD
laws themselves [6]. Lamb Meat from New Zealand [7], together with Certain
Steel Products from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) [8], provide
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excellent illustrations of these difficulties in upstream subsidies cases. Certain
Softwood Products from Canada [9], Carbon Black from Mexico [10] and the
preliminary determination of Certain Steel Products from Brazil [11] illustrate
similar difficulties in natural resource subsidy cases. These cases, which are to
be discussed in detail later, reveal how these difficulties resulted in an incon-
sistent application of the CVD laws to important U.S. trading partners [12].
Members of Congress have voiced dissatisfaction with the ITA's administra-
tion of the CVD laws in upstream subsidy cases [13]. The proposed Trade
Remedies Reform Act of 1984 [14] (TRRA) would compel the levying of
CVDs on imports that have benefited from upstream subsidies [15]. The
TRRA effectuates this expansion by widening the subsidy concept, and hence
the scope of the CVD laws, beyond their current bounds [16].
Although the TRRA and similar trade bills [171 may resolve congressional
dissatisfaction with the ITA's determinations in upstream subsidy cases, they
also threaten to damage trade relations between the United States and coun-
tries with different economic policies [18]. These proposals exemplify a trend in
U.S. trade policy that is running against the current of increasing government
participation in markets. Couched in terms of free trade theory [19], these
proposals view such participation as distortive of natural market conditions
which may be restored by using CVDs [20]. This view fails to recognize,
however, that certain forms of government market participation are so perva-
sive that it no longer makes sense to treat them as mere distortions; they have
become structural elements of the marketplace.
This Comment explores U.S. trade policy's ambivalence toward government
market participation and the current trend that proposes to resolve that
ambivalence by adopting protectionist measures cloaked in the rhetoric of free
trade. The next two sections examine the CVD laws and their underlying
policies, as well as the changes proposed by the TRRA [21]. The Comment
then examines the ITA's current administration of the CVD laws in upstream
and natural resource subsidy cases [22]. The results reveal a U.S. trade policy
riddled by inconsistencies rooted in a basic ambivalence towards government
participation in the marketplace. At this point, the potential impact of the
TRRA on these policies, U.S. business interests, and the ITA's administration
of the CVD laws, is assessed [23]. The Comment concludes with a rejection of
the recent trend towards unilateral solutions in favor of multilateral negotia-
tions toward new rules to govern this difficult trade situation.
2. An overview of countervailing duty laws and policies
2.1. The CVD laws
Section 771(5) of the Tariff Act of 1930 [24], as amended by the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 [25], defines "subsidy" as having "the same meaning
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as the term 'bounty or grant' as that term is used in... this act" [26]. The term
"bounty or grant" appears in section 303 of the 1930 Tariff Act [27] but is not
defined [28]. "Thus, section 771(5) states that 'subsidy' has the same meaning
as a phrase that is undefined" [29]. Section 771(5) does, however, provide
examples of subsidies. These examples fall into two categories: export subsid-
ies, which are specifically designed to improve export performance [30], and
domestic subsidies, which are not export contingent [31].
According to section 771(5), export subsidies include practices described in
the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, which is found in the Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [32] (Subsidies Code). That list includes
practices such as direct subsidies of a business "contingent upon export
performance"; export credit guarantees or insurance programs at premium
rates that are clearly inadequate to cover long-term operating costs; and "any
other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy" [33].
Domestic subsidies include, but are not limited to, four practices: providing
"capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial
considerations" [34]; providing "goods or services at preferential rates" [35];
granting funds or forgiving debts "to cover operating losses sustained by a
specific industry" [36]; and assuming "any costs or expenses of manufacture,
production, or distribution" [37]. If these subsidies are "provided or required
by government action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or
bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of
any class or kind of merchandise" [38], then a CVD must be levied on the
merchandise [39].
2.2. Policies of the countervailing duty laws
2.2.1. Historical background
Until the introduction of the TRRA, the U.S. legislative history of the CVD
laws evidenced a delicately balanced ambivalence between unilateralism and
protectionism on the one hand, and multilateralism and free trade on the
other. Originally, the application of the CVD laws was limited to goods that
benefited from export bounties or grants [40]. Subsequent amendments, while
enlarging the scope of the "bounty or grant" concept [41], preserved the initial
intention of levying CVDs, which was to "affect the exact amount of the
foreign subsidy and thus maintain the integrity of the [U.S.] tariff protection"
[42].
Historical developments in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) [43] are quite significant for this discussion. Signed in 1947, GATT
represented a major advance toward multilateral agreement in international
trade regulation [44]. Due to the strength of the U.S. economy in the postwar
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period, GATT was heavily influenced by the U.S. delegation's commercial
policy. That policy embraced "free, nondiscriminatory trade," and advocated
the abolition of nontariff barriers [45] as well as the reduction of all tariffs
through multilateral negotiations [46]. GAIT was thus initially based on the
economic foundation of free trade and comparative advantage [47].
Early GATT provisions neither prohibited nor imposed sanctions on the use
of subsidies, requiring merely consultation between concerned countries [48].
Subsequent amendments prohibited certain kinds of export subsidies [49] but,
apart from the original consultative recommendations, the issue of domestic
subsidies remained unaddressed until the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations [50]. The Tokyo Round produced the Subsidies Code
which recognized that although subsidies may produce adverse economic
effects on foreign countries, they nevertheless frequently serve legitimate
domestic social and economic policies [51].
In contrast, the original CVD provisions of GATT were stricter than its
subsidy provisions. Where the subsidizing country was a signatory, the provi-
sions required an importing country to find that the subsidized imports caused
or threatened "material injury" to its domestic competitors [52]. That finding
was a prerequisite for levying a CVD [53]. U.S. law contained no such test at
the time, a situation that was remedied later by Congress when it ratified the
Tokyo Round in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA) [54].
The ratification of the TAA simultaneously based the U.S. CVD laws on
two different economic models. The first is that of free trade and comparative
advantage upon which GAIT was originally based. The second is an inter-
ventionist model which recognizes the legitimacy of greater government par-
ticipation in social and economic policy-making [55].
Five years later, the House of Representatives passed the Trade Remedies
Reform Act of 1984 in response to the "disturbing pace" at which government
"intervention throughout the world is growing' [56]. The TRRA would
significantly expand the scope of the subsidy provisions of the CVD laws.
Although its goal was to "restore 'a level playing field' for U.S. industries in
international trade competition with respect to current forms of subsidy
practices" [57], the proposal would actually resolve the ambivalence in U.S.
trade policy by resorting to protectionist measures.
2.2.2. Free trade analysis of CVD policies
The free trade model allows countries to maximize their real income and
welfare "by specializing in the production of those goods with respect to which
[each country] is relatively most efficient and exchanging these through trade
for goods which it could produce at home only at relatively greater cost -- the
well known principle of comparative advantage" [58]. Government provides a
regulatory framework within which the model can operate by "'closing to all
alike all doors to private gain through injuries to others"' [591. Thus, in a free
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market, government is the umpire who insures that all players obey the rules.
Subsidies disrupt this model by distorting the free flow of trade [60]. They
reduce the recipient's business costs, thereby improving the recipient's com-
petitiveness relative to unsubsidized businesses [61]. The recipient may be able
to increase production or maintain current levels of production but sell his
products at a lower price [62]. He can thereby substitute his product for
imports [63], or even increase his share of foreign markets [64]. Either develop-
ment could cause both misallocation of domestic resources [65] and economic
injury to foreign unsubsidized industries [66].
An importing country following free trade policies can remedy this eco-
nomic injury by use of a CVD [67]. This remedy is preferable to a tariff or
quota because it offsets the subsidy's effect on the domestic market by
adjusting the price of the product, without otherwise affecting trade flows [68].
Unlike a quota or tariff, the CVD can further free trade objectives by restoring
the competitive positions of the domestic and foreign industries to pre-subsidy
levels without causing further distortions in trade flows [69].
A CVD is similar to a quota or tariff, however, to the extent that it is
intended to protect the competitor, not competition [70]. Theoretically, a pure
free trade model would impose a CVD on any subsidized import whenever
trade flows are distorted by a subsidy, irrespective of injury to a domestic
industry. The incorporation of an injury test into the CVD laws reveals an
underlying policy to correct distortions caused by foreign subsidies only when
such corrections benefit domestic industries. This underlying policy, as sug-
gested by the legislative history of the TAA [71], arguably deviates from a pure
free trade model [72]. The TRRA abandons this free trade model altogether
[73].
2.2.3. Interventionist analysis of CVD policies
Although subsidies may cause economic injury and are therefore discour-
aged in free trade theory, subsidies also serve legitimate policies that free trade
theory does not recognize. As one commentator observes,
Free trade theory ... fails to take into account a nation's various nonefficiency objectives,
goals which do not involve maximizing the flow of goods and services, as ordinarily
understood.... [A] nation may want to achieve a more equitable distribution of income ...
or avoid sudden economic dislocation in certain sectors. These are not objectives which can
be left to the efficiency of the marketplace [74].
Subsidies reflect government's shift from the role of market umpire to market
participant. Government does not simply supervise market transactions; it
changes the outcomes of those transactions in pursuit of "nonefficiency
objectives." Achievement of these objectives, however, may produce adverse
effects on foreign businesses. An injury test can be used to offset these adverse
effects.
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The presence of an injury test in the CVD laws indicates to foreign
countries that they may subsidize industries to further social and economic
policies without fear of retaliation, so long as the adverse effects of the
subsidies on U.S. industries are not too great. This suggests that an inter-
ventionist model underlies U.S. trade policy [75]. This model attempts to
accommodate two competing factors: domestic business interests and foreign
economic policies.
2.2.4. The selectivity criterion of CVD policy
Since policymakers do not view all government aid as countervailable [76],
the CVD statute contains a criterion of selectivity which must be satisfied
before the injury test, if appropriate, may even come into play [77]. The
criterion singles out industry-specific benefits as possibly countervailable,
while eliminating from consideration those that are generally available [78].
The latter are frequently distinguished from industry-specific benefits on the
theory that nonspecific benefits do not distort an economy. Rather, they filter
through it and merge "into the general background of factor endowments
which condition all national output" [79].
This selectivity criterion has been criticized on the basis that widely diffused
benefits may nevertheless cause misallocation of domestic resources and an
increase in exports [80]. A foreign competitor could thus view those benefits as
no less distortive than industry-specific benefits. Nevertheless, the U.S. CVD
laws do not levy duties on such imports because they have not benefited from a
selective subsidy [81].
The reliance on a selectivity criterion may be justified, however, as a means
of distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable government actions.
The ability to make this distinction is crucial to the administration of the CVD
laws, as well as to the maintenance of the international trade system. Remov-
ing the selectivity criterion from the CVD laws could make administration of
those laws terribly burdensome "as ... trading partners battle it out to
calculate the duties against the benefits of each other's roads, education, tax
systems, and so on" [82]. Moreover, "authors of subsidy laws have consistently
avoided labeling nationwide government economic policies as countervailable
[to avoid] impinging on the sovereign prerogatives of nations" [83]. A CVD law
that has no selectivity criterion thus carries with it the risk of foreign retalia-
tion against the legislating country's exports.
3. Upstream subsidies and the Trade Remedies Reform Act
In recent years the ITA has encountered a number of CVD petitions
alleging that foreign producers benefited from "upstream" subsidies [84]:
subsidies received by manufacturers of inputs of products which are then
exported to the United States [85]. A particularly troublesome type of up-
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stream subsidy is the so-called "natural resource" subsidy [86]. Petitions that
allege the existence of natural resource subsidies point to government pricing
of natural resources which results in one price for domestic use and another,
higher price, for export sales of the resource [87].
The ITA's handling of these cases has been severely criticized by representa-
tives of various U.S. industries [88] and by members of Congress [89]. In
response, the House of Representatives passed the TRRA which specifically
addresses upstream and natural resource subsidies with prescriptive measures
that would significantly change the ITA's approach [90]. The TRRA adds
"upstream subsidy" and "natural resource subsidy" to the list of domestic
subsidies in section 771(5) of the CVD statute [91] and provides methodologies
for determining their existence [92].
3.1. Upstream subsidies
The TRRA establishes a three-part test for determining whether an up-
stream subsidy is being bestowed upon merchandise exported to the United
States. Like the selectivity criterion and other tests discussed below, this test
must be satisfied before the TAA injury test, when applicable, may even be
considered [93]. First, the ITA must determine whether a government subsidizes
the production of an input used in the manufacture of the exported merchan-
dise under investigation [94]. Next, the ITA must determine whether such
subsidization makes the input available to the manufacturer of the exported
product at a price below the generally available price of the input product in
that country (the selectivity criterion) [95]. If the ITA determines that the
generally available price is "artificially depressed" by a subsidy, then the price
must be accordingly adjusted [96]. Finally, the ITA must determine whether
the upstream subsidy "has a significant effect" on the manufacturing costs of
the exported product (the pass-through test discussed below) [97]. If the ITA
determines that an upstream subsidy has been conferred, it must levy a CVD
on the import equal to the amount of the subsidy [98]. The TRRA also
provides that the ITA need not pursue its investigation beyond the stage of
manufacturing "that immediately precedes the final manufacturing or produc-
tion stage before export to the United States" unless "reasonably available
information" warrants such action [99].
3.2. Natural resource subsidies
The TRRA establishes a two-pronged test for determining the existence and
amount of natural resource subsidies. The first part of the test focuses on the
price for a natural resource product [100] used in the manufacturing of
merchandise exported to the United States. A natural resource subsidy exists
when: (1) government regulation lowers the domestic price "below the export
price or fair market value, (whichever is appropriate)" [101]; (2) the natural
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resource product is not "freely available" to U.S. industries at the domestic
price for purchase and export [102]; and (3) the natural resource product, if
sold domestically at the export price or fair market value, would constitute "a
significant portion of the total cost of the manufacture or production" of the
exported product [103].
Having established the existence of a natural resource subsidy, the ITA
must then determine its level. This calculation focuses on the difference
between the natural resource product's domestic and export prices. If the
product is either not exported or is exported at a price "distorted by being
significantly higher or lower than market prices ... by reason of quotas or
other government manipulation" [104], however, the standard for comparison
must be the natural resource product's "fair market value" [105]. In making
this calculation the ITA must consider the world market price and the
generally available price in the United States for the natural resource product
[106]. It must also consider the extent to which, if at all, the market price "in
the absence of government regulation" would be affected by the exporting
country's comparative advantage in such things as abundance of supply or
lower production or transportation costs [107], and by the availability or lack
of access to export markets [108].
The bill may subject government pricing of natural resource products to
both the natural resource subsidy test and the upstream subsidy test [109]. If
the ITA has "reasonably available" information that a foreign government
maintains a natural resource pricing program, then the ITA must apply the
upstream subsidy test when a natural resource product enters the production
stream at the source [110].
4. ITA cases and the Trade Remedies Reform Act
The salient difference between upstream and natural resource subsidies lies
in the nature of government action. In the former, government provides money
to exporting industries, whereas in the latter government imposes a cost on
these industries [111]. In upstream subsidy cases, the ITA is able to focus on
the amount of money provided by the government and thereby establish a
benchmark for comparing pre- and post-subsidy costs [112]. In the natural
resource subsidy cases, however, the ITA has no pre-subsidy natural resource
price to use as a benchmark [113]. The following section explores the ITA's
handling of these cases and the standards it has developed to aid in adminis-
tration of the CVD laws.
4.1. Upstream subsidies: New Zealand Lamb Meat and FRG Steel Products
Two cases that demonstrate the ITA's initial approach to upstream subsid-
ies are Lamb Meat from New Zealand [114] and Certain Steel Products from the
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Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) [115]. In the New Zealand case, the ITA
determined that government subsidies to fertilizer producers, aerial spreaders
and shippers conferred countervailable benefits to farmers who produced lamb
meat [1161. Although the farmers received no direct payments, the government
required that reductions in the cost of producing, importing and spreading
fertilizer be passed through to the farmers in the form of lower prices [117].
This "pass-through" criterion was used again by the ITA in FRG Steel
Products, although the ITA reached a different determination. In this case, the
West German government supported its troubled coal industry by restricting
imports of cheaper coal and providing direct subsidies to domestic coal
producers [118]. The ITA determined that non-FRG steel producers who
purchased the subsidized coal in "arms-length transactions" did not receive a
"pass-through" of benefits and hence their products were not countervailable
[119]. The fact that non-FRG steel producers purchased non-FRG coal at
comparable prices supported this conclusion [120].
Next, the ITA examined whether FRG steel producers benefited from the
coal support program. It concluded that a "pass-through" test could not be
used due to the import restrictions [121]. Without alternative sources of coal,
there was no basis for comparing prices for subsidized and unsubsidized coal
within the jurisdiction [122]. However, the ITA determined that if there were
no coal subsidies, there would not have been any import restrictions since the
two actions were inextricably linked by government policy [123]. Therefore, the
ITA concluded that a cross-border "competitive benefit" criterion was a more
appropriate test for assessing whether any benefits were received by the FRG
steel producer [124]. Applying this criterion, the ITA determined that FRG
steel producers actually paid a slight premium on coal and therefore enjoyed
no competitive benefit relative to other steel producers [125].
4.2. Comparative analysis and critique of current and proposed approaches to
upstream subsidies
In New Zealand Lamb Meat and FRG Steel Products the ITA applied a
pass-through test, examining whether benefits to an upstream subsidy recipient
were passed through to a downstream consumer. The ITA found that the New
Zealand farmers received the benefits of lower fertilizer prices, but non-FRG
steel producers did not benefit from the FRG coal support program [126].
Government mandated pass-throughs and evidence of arms-length transactions
respectively guided the ITA in these decisions [127].
The ITA applied a "competitive benefit" standard to FRG steel producers
[128]. It examined whether the FRG coal support program made FRG steel
producers more competitive vis-h-vis other steel producers [129]. The compari-
son revealed no relative competitive benefit to FRG steel producers [130]
although they were probably more competitive than they would have been had
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coking coal only been available at prices equal to the actual cost of production.
Despite this suggestion of some pass-through of benefits, the import restric-
tions on coal rendered the pass-through test inadequate and necessitated
application of the competitive benefit test [131].
The ITA's reliance on these two standards in the above cases reveals a
serious problem in the application of the CVD laws to upstream subsidies.
Countervailing duty case analysis cannot proceed without the crucial assump-
tion that a direct and reliable correlation exists between a subsidy and the
resulting competitive advantage [132]. However, the correlation cannot be even
considered without the ability to measure the benefits bestowed by the subsidy.
Hence, a more fundamental assumption becomes necessary, namely that the
subsidized transaction would have occurred without the subsidy [133]. This
assumption makes estimation of pre-subsidy costs possible. It is problematic,
however, because governments often rely on subsidies to induce businesses into
making investment decisions they would not have made without .such subsidies
[134]. This necessarily injects a degree of unreliability with respect to the
correlation between the subsidy and the economic benefits it bestows [135].
The unreliability is further compounded by the fact that, in an upstream
subsidy case, the subsidy bestowed may be many steps removed from the
producer whose exported product is alleged to have benefited from the
subsidy.
To illustrate, when an exporter receives a direct subsidy and drops the price
of the export proportionately, a reasonable correlation exists between the
amount of the subsidy and the unfair competitive advantage it confers [136]. A
different case exists, however, when an upstream producer receives a produc-
tion subsidy and sells the product to another producer who incorporates it into
the production of goods exported to the United States. The CVD investigation
examines benefits received by the last producer [137]. But when the subsidy
enters earlier in the production stream, the reliability of the correlation
between the subsidy and the final benefit is necessarily more questionable
[138].
Application of the TRRA's tripartite upstream subsidy test to FRG Steel
Products would most likely result in a contrary determination with respect to
FRG steel producers because the TRRA would compel the ITA to use a new
"pass-through" criterion. First, the coal support program subsidized the pro-
duction of an input of steel [139]. Second, the program probably had a
"significant effect" on the cost of producing steel in view of the import
restrictions [140]. Finally, although FRG coal appeared to be generally availa-
ble at the subsidized price [141], that price may be said to have been
"artificially depressed" by the subsidy. This final part of the test suggests that
mandatory adjustment of the price of coking coal by the ITA would result in a
finding that the natural generally available price for coking coal is the actual
cost of production [142]. The TRRA adopts the argument that the coal support
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program should be viewed no differently from a coal allowance paid directly to
steel producers [143], notwithstanding that the FRG steel producers were not
treated preferentially within West Germany [144]. By requiring the ITA to use
the actual costs incurred by the FRG coal producers as a basis for comparing
prices of subsidized and unsubsidized coal, even though all FRG coal was
subsidized [145], the TRRA produces a perverse result: FRG steel would be
countervailed whereas non-FRG steel would not, even though comparable
prices were paid by both groups of producers for coal.
This solution to the problem only complicates matters. It reads out of the
CVD laws the selectivity criterion and the related "specific enterprise or
industry" requirement [146]. Worse yet, it disregards the pragmatic counsel of
not impinging on nationwide economic programs [147]. Thus, the TRRA's
upstream subsidy test promises to increase significantly the number of CVD
proceedings, expand dramatically the range of imports upon which CVDs will
be levied, and increase tension between the United States and its trading
partners.
4.3. Natural resource subsidies: Canadian Softwood Products, Mexican Carbon
Black, and Brazilian Carbon Steel Products
In Certain Softwood Products from Canada, the ITA examined Canadian
Federal and Provincial Government stumpage programs which licensed access
to government-owned stands of timber [148]. In determining that these pro-
grams did not confer a countervailable export subsidy, the ITA noted three
facts. First, insofar as the stumpage programs were neither export contingent
nor export stimulative, they did not confer export subsidies [149]. Secondly, the
programs were available on similar terms throughout Canada "regardless of
the industry or enterprise of the recipient" [150]. Indeed, any limitations on the
kinds of industries that could take advantage of the stumpage programs
"reflect[ed] the inherent characteristics of this natural resource and the current
level of technology" and not "the activities of the Canadian government"
[151]. Third, the programs actually imposed costs on Canadian industries [152].
Finally, the ITA declined to compare Canadian and U.S. stumpage costs
because each stand of timber was "unique due to a variety of factors" [153].
Cross-border comparisons would therefore have been "arbitrary and capri-
cious" [154].
In Carbon Black from Mexico, the ITA again rejected cross-border compari-
sons [155]. In this case, the Mexican Government used a two-tier pricing policy
for natural gas and carbon black feedstock [156]. Under this policy, these
resources were exported at world marked prices, but made available to all
domestic consumers at a lower price [157]. Since the government's program
involved the provision of goods, the ITA, following statutory mandate, in-
vestigated the existence of preferentiality, which the ITA defined as being
"more favorable to some users than to others within the jurisdiction" [158]; it
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found none [159]. In reaching this conclusion, the ITA used the reasoning of
Canadian Softwood Products to point out that the limitation on the number of
product users was dictated by the products' "inherent characteristics," not by
the government [160].
The ITA, however, did use cross-border comparisons in the preliminary
determination of Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil [161]. This case
involved the domestic sale of iron ore at levels "substantially below interna-
tional prices" [162]. Although the iron ore was nominally available to all
industries at the domestic price, in fact "the steel industry [was] by far the
dominant user of this input" [163]. The ITA therefore modified its preferential-
ity standard by resorting to a cross-border comparison of the domestic
Brazilian iron ore price with world market prices. This comparison resulted in
the preliminary determination of a countervailable benefit [164]. In the final
determination, however, the ITA concluded that no countervailable benefit
had been conferred [165]. Further investigation had revealed that at least four
producers of iron ore sold their product below the government-set rates, which
led the ITA to conclude that "market forces ... set the prices of iron ore in
Brazil" [166]. The ITA explicitly declined to consider whether its reasoning in
the preliminary determination had been correct [167].
4.4. Comparative analysis and critique of current and proposed approaches to
natural resource subsidies
The ITA had uniformly applied a preferentiality standard in the earlier
natural resource subsidy cases. However, that standard was discarded under
extreme circumstances, detailed by Brazilian Steel Products, in favor of cross-
border cost comparisons. In this extreme case, the test applied to Brazilian
steel producers closely resembled the competitive benefit test applied to FRG
steel producers in FRG Steel Products [168].
Application of the preferentiality test in natural resource subsidy cases can
be problematic because not all industries may be able to use government-priced
natural resources. The ITA seemed to resolve this problem in the Canadian
and Mexican cases by limiting its inquiry to whether use limitations were due
to government actions rather than to the "inherent characteristics" of the
natural resource [169]. The compelling rationality of this limitation makes the
ITA's preliminary determination in the Brazilian case disturbing. By focusing
on the fact that steel producers-were the only actual beneficiaries of the pricing
program within Brazil, the ITA seemed to disregard the possibility that such a
development was due more to the inherent characteristics of iron ore than to
the actions of the Brazilian government.
The contrast between the outcomes of the Mexican and Brazilian cases is
alarming. This difference suggests a preferentiality standard that would permit
Mexico to price its domestically consumed natural gas below world prices but
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would penalize Brazil for doing the same with its iron ore, solely because fewer
Brazilian industries could use iron ore. The difference in outcome is a result of
the ITA's inconsistent use of cross-border cost comparisons.
The use or rejection of cross-border comparisons can nevertheless be
justified in each ITA case. In Canadian Softwood Products and Mexican
Carbon Black, the ITA wisely chose not to make cross-border comparisons,
thereby recognizing that the subsidy calculation in each case should only
measure the impact of government action on business costs in each govern-
ment's jurisdiction [170]. One would expect similar government policies to
receive similar treatment under the ITA's standards [171]. The use of a
cross-border comparison in Brazilian Steel Products, however, was understan-
dable because only one industry benefited from the program. The comparison
thus accommodated the purpose of the CVD laws, namely to negate the impact
of seemingly selective foreign government actions on U.S. competitors [172].
This varying approach suggests a tension between competing CVD policy
objectives of free trade and protectionism. A free trade policy would not use
cross-border comparisons because the focus of the investigation would be on
distortions in trade flows emanating from the exporting country. A pro-
tectionist approach, however, would be expected to focus on the position of
U.S. industries relative to foreign competitors, thus necessitating reliance on
cross-border comparisons.
This inconsistency in approach exposes a greater problem that presents the
ITA with a real quandary and thus epitomizes the ambivalence in U.S. trade
policy toward government market participation. Government pricing of natu-
ral resources prompts different applications of the CVD laws, depending on
whether the free trade or interventionist model is followed. Under the free
trade model, government pricing should be commercially reasonable and,
indeed, the CVD laws impose a "private investor" standard on government
programs [173]. In contrast, the interventionist model recognizes that govern-
ment acts as a sovereign when it establishes a price for a natural resource that
it holds in the public trust. Government pricing of natural resources thus sets
the two models at odds. The difficulty experienced by the ITA in its struggle to
reconcile competing policies of equal importance is understandable given that
the ITA must stay within the bounds of a law that is based on both policies.
The TRRA would resolve this philosophical dilemma with a natural re-
source subsidy test that serves neither free trade nor interventionist concerns
[174]. The test widens the scope of CVD laws so as to encompass two-tier
pricing programs such as the one found in Mexican Carbon Black [175].
Applying the test to such a program would compel the ITA to find that
government policies result in a domestic price for the natural resource product
that is both lower than the export price and not "freely available" to U.S.
purchasers at the lower price. If application of the export price to domestic
industries results in a finding that the cost of the natural resource product
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would constitute a significant portion of the total cost of the final product
under investigation, then the ITA would be compelled to conclude that a
natural resource subsidy exists [176]. The level of the subsidy usually would be
the difference between the export and domestic prices [177].
Although this test may initially appear consistent with a private investor
standard, and hence with the free trade model, comparison of this test with the
upstream subsidy test reveals the bill's inherently protectionist nature. Whereas
the TRRA imposes a pass-through test in such upstream subsidy cases as FRG
Steel Products, it selectively imposes a competitive benefit test in natural
resource subsidy cases. Availability of the natural resource product to U.S.
purchasers at the lower domestic price is made a criterion of the natural
resource subsidy test even though that availability may be irrelevant to the fact
situation within the foreign country [178].
Moreover, even if a government sold its natural resource to some U.S. firms
at the domestic price, theoretically its exports could still be found to have
benefited from an upstream subsidy [179]. Applying the upstream subsidy test
could still result in a finding that domestic producers had access to the natural
resource at a price that, although generally available, was artificially depressed
because of government subsidies that significantly reduced manufacturing
costs.
Another flaw in the TRRA is that its natural resource subsidy provisions
deviate from GATT. The pricing of natural resources by governments bears no
similarity to the examples of export subsidies listed in the Subsidies Code
[180]. Those examples all involve the assumption of costs by the government
[181], an event that does not necessarily occur in government pricing of natural
resources. This type of pricing actually imposes costs on industries [182].
Charging a higher price for exports of a natural resource than for its domestic
consumption is hardly likely to stimulate exports of the natural resource. The
one well-recognized characteristic of an export subsidy - a domestic price that
exceeds the export price [183] - is absent from government pricing of natural
resources.
Natural resource pricing programs also bear no similarity to production
subsidies. Although a foreign competitor may benefit from such a program, the
TRRA's generalization concerning such benefits departs from the view that the
mere existence of a benefit by itself is not sufficient to establish the existence
of a countervailable subsidy [184]. A more plausible view, consistent with
GATT but contrary to the TRRA's view of these pricing programs, is that
governments simply may be making use of their comparative advantage in
natural resources [185]. Other factors may account for the different prices in
the domestic and world markets [186]. The exporting country could not
reasonably be expected either to deny its industries access to the natural
resource or to export it for less than the world market price. Moreover, even if
that country stopped exporting the natural resource altogether, the TRRA's
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upstream subsidy test could still penalize it for making the product available
domestically at a reasonable, albeit lower, price [187].
The protectionist nature of the TRRA is further revealed in its two-fold
approach which penalizes governments both for internalizing externalities and
for exercising their comparative advantages. In FRG Steel Products, the FRG
government internalized the costs of mining coal by compensating the coal
companies for factors peculiar to West Germany that drove up production
costs [188]. The petitioners argued that "the cost of purchasing inefficient West
German coking coal is ... a cost of doing business in West Germany" [189].
The core of such an argument is that any time the government reduces a cost
of doing business, it thereby confers a subsidy. The TRRA adopts this
rationale in its upstream subsidy test. This rationale, however, implies that
access to natural resources at below world market prices constitutes a lower
cost of doing business for domestic industries. The TRRA's natural resource
subsidy test rejects this result when the cost of doing business is beneficial to a
foreign industry relative to U.S. competitors [190].
5. Ramifications for U.S. business
During the hearings that preceded consideration of the TRRA, one witness
commented that "[t]he one certain golden rule ... in international trade is that
anything we do to others will be done to us" [191]. The TRRA's unilateral
expansion of the subsidy concept and the scope of the CVD laws will almost
surely provoke foreign retaliation. The vulnerability of U.S. exports is il-
lustrated by a 1979 case involving exports of synthetic fibers from the United
States to Europe [192]. The European Communities protested that the price of
the fibers unfairly undercut European prices because of U.S. regulation of the
price of natural gas, an input of synthetic fibers [193]. Although the dispute
disappeared [194], it re-emerged during the 1982 European steel cases when
coal support programs such as the one in West Germany were characterized as
upstream subsidies for steel producers [195]. If the European Communities had
decided to employ an upstream subsidy test such as that in the TRRA, then
the U.S. synthetic fiber manufacturers would have been found to have be-
nefited from artificially depressed natural gas prices.
Some proponents of the TRRA have criticized the ITA for being overly
concerned with the reaction of foreign countries to the strengthening of the
CVD laws [196]. Indeed, during one set of hearings a Congressman exclaimed:
"My answer is, who cares? I don't care. I am concerned about what we do as it
relates to our own country" [197]. These proponents should care, however,
because import policy cannot be made in a vacuum. Many U.S. businesses
benefit from government programs which, under the TRRA's tests, could be
viewed as providing subsidies [198]. Considering that much of the recent
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growth in manufacturing employment in the United States has been export
related [199], foreign retaliation against U.S. exports in response to the TRRA
could have a significantly adverse impact on the United States.
Ironically, the TRRA could also result in the levying of CVDs on imports of
products produced by U.S. companies overseas. Some U.S. oil companies are
considering the formation of chemical complexes in the Middle East "where
state-owned industries often supply energy from state-owned sources at
below-market prices" [2001. U.S. oil company officials are concerned that
exporting the petrochemicals produced in these plants to the United States
would invite "competing domestic producers ... [to] charge that the low-cost
energy is an upstream subsidy" [201]. The TRRA's upstream subsidy provi-
sions make such results very likely.
6. Conclusion
This Comment has examined the operation of the CVD laws and the
difficulties encountered by the ITA in applying those laws to upstream and
natural resource subsidies. These difficulties are in part due to the fact that
subsidies continue to be viewed as merely market distortions, easily corrected
by CVDs. Such a view disregards the political reality of a "new social
contract" [202] that evolved after 1945, when the idea that governments were
responsible for their economies "took on a new meaning once it was believed
that government not only should but could prevent depressions, guarantee
something like full employment, and keep the unemployed, the old, the weak,
and even just the feckless from the depths of poverty" [203]. Free trade theory
is inadequate to alleviate the pressures created by this new social contract.
Judge Maletz of the Court of International Trade explains the consequences of
free trade theory's shortcomings:
In the wake of the Great Depression government after government in the West relegated
Adam Smith and his "invisible hand" to the history books in favor of Keynesian and other
interventionist economic policies. The pure market theory is today a mere theoretical
model. It is safe to say that there is now no government professing to adhere to the
private-enterprise system which does not to an ever increasing extent insinuate itself into
the macroeconomics of a country [204].
This new social contract has transformed certain forms of government market
participation from mere distortions into structural elements of the market-place.
The TRRA proposes to resolve problems in administering the CVD laws by
dramatically enlarging the subsidy concept. Its provisions would encompass
benefits of nationwide economic programs, such as government pricing of
natural resources. Its adoption would provoke foreign retaliation against U.S.
exports [205].
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The TRRA does serve a useful purpose, however. Its presence has sparked
debate about the CVD laws and has called attention to the fact that these laws
cannot address upstream and natural resource subsidies in a consistent fashion.
Unfortunately, although the TRRA's provisions might bring consistency to
CVD proceedings, the results would be consistently wrong.
A better response is the resolution of the ambivalence in U.S. trade policy
through multilateral negotiations for the formulation of new rules dealing with
government participation in markets. Proponents of the TRRA would do well
to remember that previous unilateral attempts to protect U.S. business from
foreign competion proved disastrous, notwithstanding confident predictions to
the contrary. Consider, for example, Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon's
response to an inquiry as to whether certain proposed legislation would harm
U.S. business interests: "I have canvassed the situation with the Secretary of
Commerce, and the notion that this law is going to destroy our foreign trade
expressed in some quarters is certainly without foundation" [2061. The legisla-
tion was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff.
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... in an arms-length transaction in the absence of goverhment regulation." Id.
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[109] See supra text accompanying notes 91-92, 99.
[110] See id.
[111] See infra text accompanying notes 114-18, 152.
[112] Cf. Holmer, supra 29, at 413 (where supplier and downstream manufacturer are vertically
integrated, the ITA will consider the subsidy to be passed through if "the supplier's [postsubsidy]
prices are below prevailing prices").
[113] See infra text accompanying notes 148, 156-57, 162. In all these cases, the ITA was faced
with natural resources available only at government-set prices.
[114] Lamb Meat from New Zealand; Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty De-
termination, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,128 (Int'l. Trade Admin. Nov. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as New
Zealand Lamb Meat].
[1151 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products From the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 47 Fed. Reg. 39,345 (Int'l. Trade Admin. Sept. 7, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as FRG Steel Products].
[116] See New Zealand Lamb Meat, supra note 114, at 58,129.
[117] Id. at 58, 130.
[118] See FRG Steel Products, supra note 115, at 39,351-52.
[119] Id. at 39,351. This reasoning was based upon economic assumptions which have not been
subjected to rigorous analysis. Telephone interview with Gary Horlick (Feb. 18, 1984), former
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce. See also infra
text accompanying notes 131-32.




[124] Id. The term "competitive benefit" is borrowed from Horlick, supra note 42, at 74-77.
[125] See FRG Steel Products, supra note 115, at 39, 351.
[126] See supra text accompanying notes 116, 120.
[127] See supra text accompanying notes 116, 120.
[128] See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
[129] See supra text accompanying notes 124.
[130] See supra text accompanying note 125.
[131] See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
[132] Cf. Shuman, Comments on the April 1984 Revision of the Commerce Department's
Methodology for Subsidy Quantification, in Import and Export Administration, supra note 29 at
17-18 (discussing the ITA's use of accrual accounting, which is based on the "nearly universally"
recognized "separation of the concepts of benefit (or cost) from the receipt (or disbursal) of cash").
Thus, when a firm's cash flow is increased by the bestowal of a subsidy, the ITA seeks to measure
the consequent benefit. If, as the statute mandates, the ITA must levy a CVD that offsets "the net
subsidy," see supra note 5 and accompanying text, then there must be an implicit assumption of a
direct correlation between a subsidy and the benefit it bestows.
[1331 Interview with John S. Sciortino, Esq., Staff Assistant to Commissioner David B. Rohr,
U.S. International Trade Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 17, 1984).
[134] See, e.g., ASG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 1200 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (case
involving regional development programs maintained by the Italian government).
[135] Sciortino interview, supra note 133; see also Shuman, supra note 132, at 25 (" It is wrong
to assume that absent a subsidy the firm would have acquired capital at a cost to finance the same
activities.").
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[136] Cf. Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products From
Belgium, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,304, 39,322 (Int'l. Trade Admin. Sept. 7, 1982). ("Under the Act, the
Commerce Department is required to determine whether respondents have received subsidies
within the meaning of the Act. To do so, the Department seeks to determine whether or not
respondents have received directly or indirectly an economic benefit. Whereas this is relatively easy
in the case of the direct bestowal of a grant, it is quite difficult with regard to indirect subsidies
allegedly conferred through the subsidization of inputs used in a final product') (emphasis added).
[1371 See id.
[138] See supra note 136. Nevertheless, the assumption is necessary if the CVD laws are to be
administerable. Interview with Charles L. Anderson, Economist, Coopers & Lybrand, Washington,
D.C. and former case analyst in the Office of Policy, Import Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce (Feb. 20, 1984).
[139] See supra text accompanying note 94.
[140] See supra text accompanying note 97.
[141] There was some confusion on this point. The ITA conceded that there was insufficient
evidence in the administrative record to sustain a finding that coking coal was generally available
at the subsidized price. See FRG Steel Products, supra note 115, at 38,351. However, it was never
established that only FRG steel producers had access to the subsidized coal. Moreover, petitioners
conceded that coal was being generally subsidized and made available to all, although they
distinguished between coal and coking coal. See Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix at 1, Republic Steel
Corp. v. United States, No. 82-6-00909 (Ct. Int'l. Trade, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's
Brief].
1142] See supra text accompanying note 96.
[1431 Petitioners argued this point in the administrative proceedings. See In the Matter of
Certain Steel Products from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, The Federal Republic of
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Brazil, Spain, South Africa and Romania: Petition
for the Imposition of Countervailing and (with Respect to Romania) Antidumping Duties, at
76-77 (U.S. Dept. of Comm. and U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n., petition concurrently filed Jan. 11,
1982).
[144] See supra note 141.
[145] See id.
1146] See supra text accompanying notes 38, 78.
[147] See supra text accompanying note 83.
[148] Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Softwood Products From
Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (Int'l. Trade Admin. May 31, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Canadian
Softwood Products].
[149 See id. at 24,167.
[150] Id. Although the ITA applied the normal "preferentiality" standard, see infra text
accompanying note 159, it noted that in some cases, "the number of users of a good or service may
be so limited that the preferentiality test may need to be examined further." Id. at 24,167 n.3.
[151] Id. at 24,167.
[152] Id. at 24,168.
[153] Id.
[154] Id.
[155] Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, 48
Fed. Reg. 29,564 (Int'l. Trade Admin. June 27, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Carbon Black].
[156] Id. At 29,566.
[157] Id.




E.P. Salonen / Countervailing duties
[161] Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil; Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determinations. 49 Fed. Reg. 5157 (Int'l Trade Admin. Feb. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Brazilian
Steel Products].
[162] Id. at 5160.
[1631 Id.
[164] Id.
[165] Certain Carbon Steel Products From Brazil; Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determinations, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,988, 17,992 (Int'l. Trade Admin. Apr. 26, 1984).
[166] Id.
[167] Id.
[168] See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
[1691 See supra text accompanying notes 151. 160.
[170] Holmer, supra note 29, at 422-42 (discussing valuation of subsidies).
[171] Cf. Cooper, U.S. Policies and Practices on Subsidies in International Trade, in Interna-
tional Trade and Industrial Policies 107 (S. Warnecke ed. 1978) ("We are concerned here mainly
with 'subsidies,' that is, with actions that make the affected firms more competitive ... than they
would be in the absence of the government action.") (emphasis added).
[172] See supra text accompanying note 78.
[173] Anderson interview, supra note 38.
1174] See infra text accompanying notes 181, 187-89.
[175] See Natural Resource Subsidy Hearings, supra note 86, at 1 (press release of Oct. 12,
1983, from Subcomm. on Trade announcing hearings).
[176] See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
[177] Id.
1178] See Mexican Carbon Black, supra note 155, at 29,568.
[179] See supra text accompanying note 91.
[180] See supra text accompanying note 33.
[1811 Id.
[182] See supra text accompanying note 152.
1183] See Anderson & Humpage, supra note 3, at 11.
[184] See Horlick, supra note 76, at 31.
[185] Cf. supra text accompanying note 58 (definition of comparative advantage, which is at
the core of the free trade theory).
[186] OPEC, for example, has affected the world market price of oil. See H. Gray, supra note
45, at 296, 408; Rothschild & Emerson, Born Again Cartel, The New Republic, Nov. 5, 1984, at
20.
[187] See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
[188] See FRG Steel Products, supra note 115, at 39,351-52.
[189] Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 141, Appendix at 3.
[190] See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
[191] Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 88, at 540 (testimony of Gary Horlick).
[1921 Imports of Synthetic Fibers from U.S. Create Problems for EEC. Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,232 (1982).
[1931 Id.
[194] Telephone interview with Anna Snow, Delegation of the EEC, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 5,
1984).
[195] Sciortino interview, supra note 133.
[196] See, e.g., Natural Resource Subsidy Hearings, supra note 86, at 37 (remarks of Rep.
Marty Russo, Illinois).
[1971 Id.
[198] Trade Remedy Hearings, supra note 88, at 540 (testimony of Gary Horlick). The list of
industries includes agriculture, computers, semiconducters and, ironically, steel. Id.
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[199] See New York Stock Exchange, Office of Economic Research, U.S. International
Competitiveness: Perception and Reality - A New York Stock Exchange Study of Trade,
Industrial Change and Jobs 22 (1984).
[200] Madison, Strategic Value of Introducing Trade Bill May be More Important Than Passage,
Nat'l J., Jan. 14, 1984, at 64-65.
[201] Id. at 65; see also Note, Upstream Subsidies, supra note 18, at 274-75.
[202] Diebold, United States in the World Economy: A Fifty Year Perspective, 62 For. Aff. 81,
93 (Fall 1983).
[203] Id.
[204] Carlisle Tire and Rubber Company, 564 F. Supp. 834,839 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1983); see also
Zysman & Cohen, Double or Nothing: Open Trade and Competitive Industry, 61 For. Aff. 1113,
1124-25 (Summer 1983).
[205] See EC Warns Trade Law Changes Could Hurt U.S. Relations with Trading Partners, 9
U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 129-30 (Oct. 10, 1983), Statement of the Delegation of the European
Communities on Proposed U.S. Trade Law Reform, 9 U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 165-66 (Oct. 10,
1983).
[206] 72 Cong. Rec. 11,510 (1930) (statement by Secretary Mellon on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
submitted for the Record by Rep. Robert L. Bacon, New York).
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